One radar error, and a routine Russian war crime becomes the first shot of a nuclear war

Random missile shots against Black Sea grain vessels run a serious risk

In the western Black Sea things have been quiet for most of this year. Merchant ships have carried grain from Ukraine down to the Bosphorus and so to the world’s markets largely unmolested. But in the last month, things have changed – in a very dangerous way.
The attack of 9 October on the Ukrainian port of Chornomorsk, hitting a Panama-flagged ship and killing six, is the seventh attack on commercial shipping since 11 September. Prior to this recent flurry, the last strike was on MV Aya in December 2023: she was hit by a mine near the Danube River. I’ll come back to mines later.
The first of the renewed attacks was a missile strike on MV Aya (the same one). The ship was at sea near the Danube. September then saw three more missile attacks, all at sea and all striking ships carrying grain. Damage was sustained each time but thankfully no fatalities. On Sunday a Saint Kitts and Nevis flagged corn carrier was struck in Pivdennyi harbour and on Monday a Palau-flagged vessel in Odesa, killing one person. And now we have the strike on the MV Shui Spirit whilst alongside in Chornomorsk.
So, seven missile attacks. Vladimir Putin is clearly making a renewed effort to cut off Ukrainian grain exports. He wants to do this partly to deny Ukraine foreign exchange, and partly to create a desire around the world for the fighting to end. Ukraine is one of the breadbaskets of the world, and if Putin can cut off its supplies then grain prices will rise everywhere. In rich countries this means more expensive food: not just bread but various other things too as grain is also used as livestock feed and to make oils. In poor countries, higher grain prices can mean hunger or starvation.
So far, however, the effect on trade has been minimal. Security analysts have yet to revise their threat assessments and Ukrainian traders told Lloyd’s List: “Over the course of the war, risk tolerance has increased with traders and shippers learning to accept the persistent threat posed by Russia while trading out of Odesa’s deep sea ports”.
Sometimes in the shipping world there are delayed responses and it’s possible that insurance premiums for vessels in the Black Sea will jump: time will tell. We do know, from previous events in both the Black and Red seas, how resilient shipping and ships can be, showing an elastic ability to cope, manage, divert and recover through times like this. 
It’s certainly to be hoped that resilience continues in the face of Putin’s renewed attacks. We know from the early period of the war, before Russia’s Black Sea Fleet was forced to retreat into eastern waters and bases, that a cutoff of Ukrainian grain has a marked effect in receiving countries, particularly in Africa. For now at least, however, Putin isn’t making much of a dent. Discussion with Yoruk Isik of the Bosphorus Observer maritime consultancy and others makes it clear that the tonnage of grain that has been hit in the latest attacks, compared to what is available, is so small as to be irrelevant. If Putin’s plan is to weaponise hunger, he isn’t making much progress. 
He might be having some impact in other ways, however. There is a high degree of correlation between these hits and various important dates. For example, the one on 8 October was set to coincide with the planned summit meeting in Ramstein, although that was postponed as Biden stayed in the US to oversee Hurricane Milton relief efforts. It’s not hard to imagine what message Putin intended to send with an attack on 11 September. Much of this is about creating noise. 
Another thing to remember is that attacks on non-combatant shipping are illegal under the international laws of warfare – these attacks are war crimes. We know Putin doesn’t really care about this, but the fact that the Russians keep saying after these attacks that the ship was carrying weapons (none of them were, of course) suggests the disregard isn’t absolute. 
Some people think Ukraine might now mount counter-strikes against Russian commercial shipping. I’m sceptical of this: it would be a shift that would certainly see Zelensky’s international legitimacy challenged. Ukraine can and will hit ships moving munitions into Crimea, but a wider attack on Russian shipping in general is unlikely.
Can Ukraine mount a defence for ships travelling between Odesa and Romanian waters – that is, Nato waters – to the south?
It sounds obvious, but much depends on how badly Ukraine wants to. Patriot missile batteries could be moved into critical areas but, if you’re going to do that, what are you prepared to leave undefended? Prioritising precious weapons is a brutal business. One would normally consider positioning warships with anti-air capability to protect the trade route but Turkey is the only Black Sea navy with such ships. Improved surveillance, hardened infrastructure (such as the alternative power supply to Odesa port) and accepting the occasional hit might just make more sense for now. 
Ukraine will, however, want to make targeting as hard as possible. Putin’s forces have many weapons able to strike ships in the western trade route – if necessary from far beyond the Black Sea itself, in the case of things like the Kalibr cruise missile – but in order to launch them it must first know roughly where there is a ship to be hit and where it will be when the weapon arrives.
Strategically, Russia can be prevented from scanning the western Black Sea from afar using airborne radar by keeping the aircraft which can do this busy elsewhere. There are some indications that Ukraine’s friends may be helping with this. Nonetheless Russia is probably gaining some intelligence – if not a complete real-time picture – using such means as satellites and human intelligence assets (spies), and perhaps the Podsolnukh (“Sunflower”) radar system in Crimea. The Podsolnukh is an over-the-horizon radar, however, meaning that it is probably not to be relied upon.
Tactics used in the attacks thus far would support the idea that Russia has only fragmentary information on shipping movements in the northwestern Black Sea. The first two attacks appear to have seen Kitchen AS-4 anti-ship missiles fired from Backfire bombers to the east. These were probably launched towards an area where the Russians thought there was likely to be a target and then the missile’s own seeker head switched on early to guide it in for the strike. This has been in Russian doctrine since the Granit P-700 missile of the Cold War.
The problem is, a missile seeker head radar is very basic. If you’ve ever seen the picture a missile seeker head produces you’ll know what I mean and this is why navies spent a lot of money developing ways to confuse or distract such seeker heads. Such “soft-kill” methods often had a higher chance of success than shooting the missile down with another missile.
In the few seconds the missile has to decide what it will select, if another larger vessel is passing, or there is something else with a stronger radar return in its picture, it will probably lock on to that. This means it might hit almost anything, and it might easily go into third-party territorial waters: probably those of Romania in this case.
In other words the missile may strike Nato territory. In the sweep of a tiny radar head the strike has gone from a mere war crime – just another day at the office for Putin – to a Nato Article V test case and a possible nuclear war.
Summing up, while this uptick in strikes is notable, at the moment it isn’t causing much damage or alarm. The noise the attacks generate isn’t being noticed. For now, at the strategic level, nothing big is happening. 
So for me, the story here is the risk of miscalculation or mistake. The hundred-plus illegal free-floating mines Putin has released into the Black Sea – potentially to drift into Nato waters and there commit an automated, random act of war – have now been joined by big missiles, using old technology, working on partial targeting information and striking largely at random.
In terms of the war’s course, the Black Sea remains a theatre where both sides challenge and stretch each other’s resources but a decisive result is unlikely. Unfortunately Russian forces are using tactics which could easily escalate the war far beyond Ukraine.
Every such attack is a foolish gamble risking the very highest stakes: and Putin is now rolling those dice again and again.